A ‘Fear’ Studies Perspective and Critique: Analyzing English and Stengel’s Progressive Study of Fear and Learning in *Education Theory*

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The In Search of Fearlessness Institute is dedicated to research and publishing on fear, fearlessness and emotions in general, as well as critical reviews of such works. Preference is given to works with an integral theoretical perspective.
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Abstract

The author critiques the progressive approach of two contemporary educational philosophers (English and Stengel) on the topic of fear and learning. Using a postmodern integral approach, this article examines the tendency of reductionism, individualism, and psychologism as part of a hegemonic liberalism and modernism in discourses on fear and learning commonly adopted by educators. A critical fear management/education and ‘Fear’ Studies agenda are posited as both a location for critique of the hidden curriculum in fear studies in general, and as a new site for a more productive and emancipatory discourses on fear and ‘fear’ for a post-9/11 world.

The study of fear by any systematic means, especially in a post-9/11 world, ought to be applauded—that is, as long as its motivation and outcomes are truly ethical in intent and practices. Such an exemplary study would necessarily promote the reduction (if not elimination) of the harmful affects and effects of excessive fear-based perceptions, emotions, values, beliefs, morals, cognitive analysis, and everyday actions. Such a sociopolitical promotion and educational agenda surely would be called progressive.

What progressive educational philosophers can we draw upon to promote such an agenda? How can we critique them and improve upon their emancipatory work? This article engages some contemporary progressive educators, who have concentrated their research on the role of fear in learning.

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1 Fisher is co-founder of In Search of Fearlessness Project (1989-) and Research Institute (1991-) of which archives can be found at http://www.feareducation.com (click on "Projects"). He is also founder of the Center for Spiritual Inquiry & Integral Education (http://csiie.org), and is Department Head at CSIE of Integral & ‘Fear’ Studies. He is a consultant, researcher, coach, artist, teacher and Principal of his own company (http://loveandfearsolutions.com). He can be reached at: rmfisher.88@frontier.com
Although this is not entirely a new topic for educational philosophy, it is one that has arguably a long way to go in terms of systematic inquiry and maturing of theory and practices. It is extremely rare to find any ongoing critical discourse on the topic of fear in education, especially where different (and conflicting) perspectives on fear are taken and/or synthesized. It is hoped that the situation will change based on recent publications, yet this author remains skeptical for several reasons.

This article, and the one it critiques (English and Stengel; henceforth E & S),\(^2\) locate in the historical genre of fear studies that pursue both a better critical understanding of fear in relation to education, and a nonviolent corrective to a hegemony of violent discourses\(^3\) and dynamics in societies. Although E & S do not explicitly explicate or admit the latter aim, they explicitly support the former in their study on “fear in educational contexts,” and “fear as a pedagogical phenomenon:"

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\(^{1}\) One could include diverse meanings of violence from the gross physical forms (that is, forms of coercion and hurting), to oppressions of various kinds, to paradigm and culture wars perpetuating more subtle epistemic and symbolic violence (Bourdieu) of various forms. As a Foucauldian critical discourse analysis of the hidden curriculum in conflict management/education, the author linked fear in an interconnected network of phenomena called DCFV theory (D = dominance, C = conflict, F = fear, V = violence). This theory was conceptualized as a counter-hegemonic (emancipatory) conflict theory view (in contra-distinction to functionalism) for analyzing ‘conflict.’ In a nutshell, the theory says “domination” exists and always will as long as you have distinctions (in duality), the real problem is how do we deal with (manage) the inherent conflict that arises when domination exits? If we don’t do the conflictwork well, then, the result is fear, and when we don’t manage that well, then, the fear turns to “violence.” DCFV was posited as a new theory to guide us to nonviolence by undermining he dynamics of the cycle of violence. Fear obviously plays a crucial role in this theory, but not the only one. Years later, this author further utilized DCFV theory, with a postmodern sensibility, in order to deconstruct ‘fear’ discourses in relation to domination, conflict, and violence (including oppression-repression dynamics) in a post-9/11 era. P. Bourdieu, “Symbolic violence,” _Critique of Anthropology_, 4(1979): 77-85. See also R. M. Fisher, _Toward a ‘Conflict’ Pedagogy: A Critical Discourse Analysis of ‘Conflict’ in Conflict Management Education_, unpublished masters thesis (Vancouver, BC: The University of British Columbia, 2000); R. M. Fisher, _Fearless Leadership In and Out of the ‘Fear’ Matrix_, unpublished dissertation (Vancouver, BC: The University of British Columbia, 2003), 70-1.
Ultimately, fear’s status in educational interaction is ambiguous, but its impact is unavoidable. We have sought to reveal fear to bring it to the attention of educators and to invite them [through our challenge and in challenging themselves] to assess fear’s power and potential.

E & S, as professional educational philosophers, have set upon a path one could call a progressive challenge to educators of all stripes—that is, to critically “assess fear’s power and potential” in curriculum and pedagogical practices. At the same time, they note a lacuna in progressive circles in the field of education, whereby,

Fear is not the first feature of educational experience associated with the best-known progressive educational theorists—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Dewey, and Paulo Freire. But each... have something substantive to say about how fear functions in the processes of learning and growth.

Although several angles of critique could be brought to bear on E & S’s approach to the study of fear, this article is interested to explore the adequacy and ethicality of intent and practices promoted in E & S’s study. An alternative and complementary approach is offered as a referent for critical analysis of all fear studies.

Hidden Curriculum Amongst Progressive Agendas

It would not be a surprise to most educators that any type of educational philosophy, theory, analysis, curricula or pedagogy has a biased agenda. This includes progressive discourses. Often these are

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4 Ibid., 542.
5 Ibid., 521.
6 This author has undertaken a preliminary expansion to this current critique at his blogsite. See R. M. Fisher, “Fear and Learning (1-4)” series (12/23/10, 1/10/11, 1/13/11, 1/16/11) at http://fearlesstes teach.blogspot.com.
7 The “ideology of progressivism,” (1890s in America), liberal reform movement that emerged from critiques of the downside of Industrialization of American society. “Progressive curriculum... is usually associated with the ideology of progressivism and the philosophy of pragmatism” (Morshead). It is an ideology also politically grounded in Industrialism with a penchant trend toward modernist values of continuous progress economically and otherwise, which has been critiqued by environmental, postmodern, globalization, and postcolonial cultural theories (e.g.,
not claimed or explicated and a "hidden curriculum" of ideology is left unexposed, especially to the less sophisticated reader. On that basis, meeting the requirements of an ethical inquiry into fear where biases are disclosed, readers ought to be aware that this author will introduce, ever so briefly, a relatively new and thus obscure perspective called integral meta-theory into the analysis of fear and learning discourses. For some critics, such an approach may be deemed rather unprogressive—arguably, a mis-interpretation. Some advantages and disadvantages of this new approach are discussed throughout. A few recommendations for further research are suggested at the end.

Integral philosopher Ken Wilber offers a meaning frame for an integral meta-theory approach to studying anything:

*Integral...* to integrate, to bring together, to join, to link, to embrace. Not in the sense of uniformity, and not in the sense of ironing out all the wonderful differences, colors, zigs and zags of a rainbow-hued humanity, but in the sense of unity-in-diversity, shared commonalities along with our wonderful differences. And not just in humanity, but in the Kosmos at large: finding a more comprehensive view—a Theory of Everything... that makes legitimate room for art, morals, science, and religion, and doesn’t merely attempt to reduce them all to

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O’Meara et al.). This author doesn’t take a traditional conservative approach to critiquing progressivism *per se*, but rather takes a cautious inquiry and no longer idolizes educational progressivism because of its ideology and curriculum primarily based on pragmatism (e.g., Dewey). This author preferably locates this critique in the movement of postmodern philosophy and reconceptualized curriculum: “the necessary grounding for reflection, renewal, and innovation to move beyond the progressive and conservative curriculum development models of the past” (Slattery). That said, there could be a case made that pragmatism is the tradition that introduced “contingency” into inquiry and knowledge claims, and that is the basis of much of critical theory and postmodern analysis (Brookfield). The integral approach also takes contingency as sacrosanct in that all understandings and solutions are partial and open to critique and improvements. However, even the postmodern reconceptualized curriculum falls short of this author’s interest of developing an integral curriculum. See R. W. Morshead, *Patterns of Educational Practice: Theories of Curriculum* (Ypsilanti, MI: Pierian Press, 1995), 131, 327; P. O’Meara, H. D. Mehlinger and, M. Krain, *Globalization and the Challenge of a New Century: A Reader* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 72; P. Slattery, *Curriculum Development in the Postmodern Era* (New York: Routledge, 2006) [2nd ed.], 13; S. D. Brookfield, *The Power of Critical Theory: Liberating Adult Learning and Teaching* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2005), 64-65.
one’s favorite slice of the Kosmic pie.... if we succeed in developing a truly holistic or integral view of reality, then we will also develop a new type of critical theory.... The integral paradigm will inherently be critical of those approaches that are, by comparison, partial, narrow, shallow, less encompassing, less integrative.8

As problematic as these theories of everything can be, with a tendency to reductionism (e.g., everything is nothing but quarks, as in some new physics paradigms), integral approaches embrace the multi-dimensional realities and perspectives of knowing reality without over-privileging any one of them, yet does not fall into a mere eclecticism or relativism.

From a postmodern, integral9 and transdisciplinary approach, one may ask: Is fear (as emotion and affect) only a phenomenon of the body-mind (psyche) and its neurobiological bases? Much of the psychology of fear (and emotions) privileges such a reductionism at its core. It behooves us then to ask: How does any privileging of a pre-fixed location

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9 Integral approach, in this article, refers to a way of inquiry based primarily, but not exclusively, upon Integral Theory (see Ken Wilber). This is a complicated developmental and evolutionary theory of knowledge, far beyond the scope of this short paper to explain. Any search on the Internet (e.g., Wikipedia), will produce a good basic summary (see especially descriptions of the AQAL methodology). See R. M. Fisher, World’s Fearlessness Teachings: A Critical Integral Approach to Fear Management/Education for the 21st Century (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010), 52-61. Integral theory, a new type of critical theory (Crittenden), is sometimes dubbed as post-postmodern by integralists, meaning it includes the best of postmodern critique but transcends the limitations of pluralistic extreme postmodernism (e.g., extreme deconstructionist poststructuralism). Integral theory is, more or less, a reconstructive postmodern approach, with roots in the thinking of Hegel, Whitehead, Bergson, de Chardin, Aurobindo, Baldwin, Habermas, etc. (McIntosh). It is not ‘new age’ and Wilber is very critical of new age philosophies but it is spiritual-based but not religious (though some critics contest this latter point). Wilber’s latest work is post-metaphysical. J. Crittenden, “Foreword: What is the Meaning of ‘Integral’?” In K. Wilber, The Eye of Spirit: An Integral Vision for a World Gone Slightly Mad (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1997), x. S. McIntosh, Integral Consciousness and the Future of Evolution: How the Integral Worldview is Transforming Politics, Culture and Spirituality (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2007), 153-193.
(with its pre-given definition and meaning) of fear influence prescriptions of how to best educate ourselves about fear and its management?

This article, examining the hidden curriculum of fear studies via E & S’s exemplary progressive study, challenges their chosen hegemony of a hybridized modernist psychoeducational discourse. The latter, typically ends up asking rather pragmatic, functionalistic, and euhemeristic and somewhat out-dated questions about the relationship between fear and learning in educational contexts. At least, this is a critique from a more postmodern (integral) view. Such questions typically take the implicit (and seductive) ‘value-neutral’ form of ‘Does fear prevent learning? Can fear prompt learning?’, as E & S ask; or similarly, as educational mainstream consultants asked some 16 years prior: “Does fear have a positive side? If so, how do we determine when fear is working for us and when fear is working against us?” One finds this same normalizing discourse pattern in virtually every modern popular and professional book on fear in the mainstream biomedical, psychiatric and psychological fields today.

10 Without entering a cumbersome descriptive on the difference between a modernist and postmodernist discourse, ever so problematic to define easily, this author simply suggests that when “fear” is reduced to a feeling or emotion unquestionably, the discourse is modernist (i.e., scientific-modern) and liberalist (i.e., mainstream progressivist), not a more radical postmodernist one. E & S, like so many of the “fear-positivists” (see later) fall into this modernist-liberalist camp at their center, even though, in their article, they also embrace some postmodern elements (contextualist, constructivist) in overall general discourse.

11 E & S, 542.


13 This normalizing, then naturalizing, and inevitable essentializing of “fear” as pre-given in definition and meaning (i.e., reduced ontological location) is a problematic long trend to deconstruct—beyond the scope of this article. One example is “Fear is an emotion indispensable for survival” (Hannah Arendt); the authors citing Arendt then remark that they “love Arendt’s quote because it points out the usefulness [pragmatism] of fear.... Without fear to regulate our responses and actions, we may jaywalk across a superhighway...” (Quigley and Shroyer). This pattern is repeated constantly in the vast majority of texts on fear. One problem is that such a discourse confuses “alertness” and “instinctual intelligence” with “fear.” Another problem is that such a discourse dismisses any possibility of true fearlessness (a conception beyond courage). The latter are topics taken up in World’s Fearlessness Teachings. See S. Quigley and M. Shroyer, Facing Fear, Finding Courage: Your Path to Peace of Mind (Berkeley, CA: Conari Press, 1996), 12.
E & S, although with scholarly intention much deeper, end up reproducing this same pattern and level of questioning that has been part of the rather recent popular trend to take discourses on fear out from under a rigid past fear-bashing agenda—and turn fear into more of “a friend,” a “gift,” as even something “beautiful” and “intelligent.”

This author has named and critiqued this contemporary movement as “fear-positivism.”

E & S have, more or less, framed their study of fear and educational philosophers within this discourse—a discourse that is as exclusive of other discourses on fear as it is inclusive and synthesizing. A recent major study of fear and learning, which E & S unfortunately omitted to cite, took this same fear-positivism agenda and equally turned out results which are hardly radical or truly emancipatory, at least when put under the lens of a postmodern critical integral approach (i.e., fearanalysis).


15 See R. M. Fisher, “Invoking ‘Fear’ Studies,” *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 22(2006), 46; see also *World’s Fearlessness Teachings*, 100-102; and, R. M. Fisher, “Disappear Fear: Action Fearology for the 21st Century,” Technical Paper No. 26 (Vancouver, BC: In Search of Fearlessness Research Institute, 2007), 8-10. Arguably, making the “negative” affects positive can be found in the larger ahistoricized and apoliticized discourses and popularizing of the “positive psychology” movement (Seligman et al.)—and, with deeper historical and political roots going back to discourses of Continental positivism, for example, Comte et al. in early 19th century (post-revolutionary) France. The connection between an attitude of positive affect (worldview) and modernism and its methodological positivism cannot be ignored.

16 This study included interviews on fear and learning with Parker J. Palmer, Nel Noddings, Megan Boler, Starhawk, and Larry Parks Daloz. See E. VanderWeil, “Accepting the Ring of Fire: Stories of Engagement with Fear in Transformational Adult Learning,” unpublished dissertation (Spokane, WA: Gonzaga University, 2007).

17 This term, coined by this author several years ago, was meant to create an analogous parallel (and up-date) to psychoanalysis. See application of fearanalysis, for example, in the critique of emotional education. R. M. Fisher, “The Quest to Control Emotion(s): A Critical Integral Fearanalysis,” Technical Paper No. 34 (Carbondale, IL: In Search of Fearlessness Research Institute, 2009).
E & S, like others in this fear-positivism trend, make fear essential to learning. Their only problem is to make it pedagogically useful. Again, without questioning their own discourse bias and hegemonic discourse—or at least, they don’t make its problematics explicit. The ethical outcomes of such discourses are problematic as well. One of the insidious problems with all these attempts is they accept “fear as a feeling or emotion,” without questioning. ‘Fear’ Studies, as this author posits, needs to include but transcend the limitations of these kinds of fear studies, if we are to seriously improve our theories and practices of fear management and education in the future.

Progressive Intention and Fear Studies Problematic of Context

Many progressive educators, beyond whom E & S studied, have claimed any fear “used” or “justified” in education and learning, is either pathological or unethical based on their standards of education as liberation. Although, this is not the place to cite all that literature it is worth mentioning radical liberation movements such as nonviolence or satyagraha in India with Gandhi and his student Vinoba Bhave, to A. S. Neill and “free schools” are among significant counter-education movements. It is good to see more contemporary mainstream educational researchers devoting an entire journal issue on fear and education with all due cautioning of accepting fear in the educational landscape as appropriate. Yet, none perhaps more poignantly captures the core of the Fear Problem in education today than Parker J. Palmer:

When we enter the conversation about teaching not through the door marked “How To Do It” but through one marked “The Human Condition,” we discover a new world of discourse, a world that will challenge but also reward us if we are willing to engage what we find there. When I first opened that door, I quickly saw what I would need to confront—and its name is fear.... Education’s nemesis is not ignorance but fear. Fear gives ignorance its power.

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18 In 2008 Educational Policy was so dedicated to this topic; for a good overview in that issue see, R. Ginsberg and L. Frederick, “The Culture of Fear and the Politics of Education,” Educational Policy, 22(2008): 10-27.

19 Arguably, this author, more than other educators, has systematized, with extensive depth and breadth, an explicit conceptualization of the Fear Problem and its implications for education. See The World’s Fearlessness Teachings, 91-102.
We are always teaching in the face of fear; that is why we need “the courage to teach.”

Palmer recently challenged us further saying “... the teacher who teaches ‘democracy’ in a fear-based system without democratic choices is as divided as the investor who believes in health but whose wealth accrues from tobacco stocks.” He calls us to an undivided “integral life” as “integral teachers.” In an integral fashion, Palmer interweaves fear individually with collective fear (i.e., “culture of fear” as context)—he refuses to un-link them. His point: fear and its critical role cannot be ignored, and E & S and the progressive philosophers they studied agree.

The philosopher of education has the problem to sort out whether it is mere presence of fear in a learning environment that is problematic (which E & S do not see as a problem) and to what degree, or whether it is a fear-based learning environment that is only problematic? How do we separate those notions and realities? Can we?

In a recent literature review this author has promoted and documented 90 educators (published between 1989-2007) that have foregrounded the context of education in a “culture of fear,” of which many have proclaimed the urgency of re-contextualizing educational discourses in a post-9/11 era.

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22 It ought to be noted that Palmer, in 1998, was the first educator to make this inter-linking in a systematic critique (see chapter two, _The Courage to Teach_).


24 See, for example, H. A. Giroux, _The Abandoned Generation: Democracy Beyond the Culture of Fear_ (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); according to Ramsey, “More recently, the turn to the Right after the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 unleashed a new wave of censorship. In this new culture of fear, as
E & S chose to remove, or at least severely minimize, that integral contextualization (fear/culture of fear), even though they claim to “join” the researchers who have, as E & S point out, “approached the topic of fear from a sociopolitical standpoint.”25 Granted, they suggest their “approach will be more focused on fear from a learning-theoretical standpoint.”26 Implicit in this approach, they decided on a psychological standpoint. There is nothing wrong with choosing a focus, but there is more of a problem when no rationale is explicated to justify such a focus in light of the contrasting sociopolitical standpoint, which they claim to embrace but largely disregard.27 This latter problematic, avoids a crucial conflict in fear studies between functionalists and conflict theorists, a specific political-methodological topic that is beyond the scope of this critique, yet runs underneath it.

E & S, in the spirit of Palmer’s challenge, as progressive academic-educators, steeped in Dewey’s pragmatism, have gone further than most via their comparative analysis; thus, marking perhaps, a new generation of critical reflective fear studies in education:

on three progressive philosopher’s views [Rousseau, Dewey, Freire] of doubt, difficulty, and discomfort as intrinsic to [good quality] learning and... their reflections on fear [in relation to]... a series of questions about fear’s function in learning. Does fear prevent learning? Can fear prompt learning? How can an educator determine the 'best' educational environment to prevent feelings of fear from paralyzing a student? How can educators know when to protect... [and when to challenge students and themselves in the face of fear(s)]...28

This is a laudable agenda enacting important questions that all, more or less, revolve around the same basic fear problem: how do we


25 E & S, 523.
26 Ibid., 523.
27 In fairness, E & S, in part, align with the sociopolitical standpoint in the study of fear and education around “questioning the nature and value of safe spaces in educational contexts” (523).
28 Ibid., 542.
best manage fear in learning sites?—and pivoting around that is the sub-problem of: how do we best manage conflict in learning sites? Fear and conflict go together.

Clearly, E & S’s study slides along a functionalist-focused interest in fear ascribed predominantly, and historically, as a “negative emotion,” and “negative affect” where “feeling and emotion” are taken-for-granted as the best location for fear studies, at least, their own approach. Although, they are explicit their study was not about defining fear, they do not fully shy away from the task of defining and giving meaning to fear:

Here, we consider both Rousseau’s and Freire’s largely pedagogical reflections on fear and learning, as well as Dewey’s carefully crafted phenomenological insights, to uncover the meaning of fear in educational contexts. In the process, we seek to define fear as it plays a role in learning and growth.

E & S adopt a generic definition and meaning of fear (without a Palmerian context). Without critique, they adopt a foundational psychology of fear discourse (i.e., “emotion of fear”), exemplified in their preliminary study of William James, the empiricist-pragmatist. Common to the vast majority of researchers, writers, and teachers on fear, they have adopted a norm dictionary meaning for fear (“a feeling or emotion”).

In contradistinction, using a construct of ‘fear’ not merely common fear, this author’s critique of discourses on fear (and ‘fear’) is un-

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29 Ibid., 522.
30 Ibid., 542.
31 Ibid., 523; italics added for emphasis.
32 In fairness, they juxtapose Dewey’s critique of some of James’s formulations on emotions (and the popular “James-Lange theory of emotion”) (522-3). However, their basic conceptual adoption remains that of the “emotion of fear,” typical of premodern and most modern discourses based heavily in psychology and its hegemonic empiricism (if not psychologism). Any dictionary or encyclopedia today pretty much will define fear as a “feeling or emotion.” This biased framing of fear is underplayed in E & S’s article and implicitly constructs a particular pragmatist fearuality that’s left unexamined as context for their study.
33 The long theoretical rationale for this distinction is beyond the scope of this paper but it can be found in most any of this author’s publications on fear and fearlessness. Basically, fear is put under a deconstruction in the form of ‘fear’ (inverted commas) with an eventual reconstruction. Inspiration, in part, for this postmod-
derlain by a postmodern questioning (and transdisciplinarity)—asking not so much what is fear, but what and how hegemonic ideological power-knowledge discourses frame and pre-fix fear’s location (and definition), and what implications might follow (e.g., who benefits from such discourse-framing and who doesn’t)?

Fear Management/Education (FME) Discourses

Likely, E & S would not prefer framing fear solely under the umbrella of the arising popular movement of emotional intelligence discourses and their concomitant agenda to better manage emotions and construct a particular emotionality. “Schooling the emotions” is a major part of that Golemanian EQ discourse. Rightfully, as counter-


* A long history of the philosophy of emotions, theory, and management practices in the Western world could be traced to systematic writing of Aristotle. More recently, psychologists have been highly aroused to dominate the scientific discourses on emotions and their management, of which Goleman’s construction of emotional intelligence and EQ curriculum is exemplar. See for example, D. Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than I.Q (New York: Bantam, 1995).

* See M. Boler, Feeling Power: Emotions and Education (New York: Routledge, 1999), 67-69. Virtually all the EQ curriculum discourse is patterned upon modernist assumptions of control, based on managing emotions (emotionality) to fit the norms of society, with little critical pedagogical intent or interest within that agenda to challenge norms and the powers they serve. That status quo EQ curriculum has a hidden ideology, attempting to look as though it is a value-neutral movement, supported by strong scientific-psychological claims (e.g., from brain sciences)—the latter, equally insidious as ideological discourse. Goleman’s Emotional Intelligence has an entire chapter entitled “Schooling the Emotions.” And throughout the discourse of this curriculum is construction of a moral crisis, warming up
balance, E & S cite and embrace a few critical pedagogues, who have critiqued the often over simplistic defining of emotion (or affect) and the hegemonic of the hidden curriculum of managerialism that accompanies emotional (affect) education. However, E & S invariably return, implicitly, throughout their article from an inquiry into fear and learning, to fear management:

So how can one answer the question that we have drawn out in this inquiry: How can an educator determine the 'best' educational environment to prevent feelings of fear from paralyzing a student? It is impossible to know for certain and in advance the set of circumstances that shift feelings of discomfort from energizing [learning] to paralyzing [learning] for each and every student.... From Rousseau through Dewey to Freire, all have wrestled, as do classroom teachers every day, with this [management] danger and this dilemma of creating productive and educative learning environments, a danger and a dilemma that is built into the possibility of education.

Equally, E & S would not likely prefer to embrace this author’s interest to situate virtually all discourses on or around fear as, more or less, means of management (defined here as self-regulation at the individual and/or collective level of reality). E & S, typical of most post-moderns of the Third Wave (Information Age) of civilization (a la Toffler), have, rightfully so, been resentful of the pathologies of the Second Wave (Industrial Age)—and its sometimes oppressive influences on much of modern societies, including the design and policies of mass management regimes for “public education.” Toffler (1981) located the dominant power of the Industrial Age in the hands of “integrators” (i.e., managers). Ideological integrationism and/or managerialism, underlying the “measure and manage” hegemony of a good deal of educational
to moral panic, under Goleman’s diagnosis there is a “collective emotional crisis” in the world that needs to be managed and fixed by schools and other institutions, if we are to stop the violence.

37 Rightfully, in this regard, they cite the impressive scholarly studies and critiques by emotion educators, Megan Boler and Michelinios Zembylas, in footnote 1 on the first page. Managerialism refers to Michel Foucault’s notion of hegemonic excessive management of human beings for its own oppressive purposes so as to maintain a management regime for its own administrative power’s sake (i.e., for suppression, order and control).

38 E & S, 541.
policy today,\textsuperscript{39} are real—and not taken lightly by this author. However, the Fourth Wave of civilization (or Integral Age)\textsuperscript{40} takes a perspective on management as an essential cybernetic systems process of organizing, and thus, as not only pathological by necessity or one-sidedly demonic, as Third Wave critics tend to lean in their emphasis.

From an integral perspective, management—as a process, has its role, as long as it is engaged beyond the hegemonic \textit{ism}-pathologies of, particularly, the Second or First Wave (Agricultural Age).

The management of fear is also a construction of a particular notion of fearuality.\textsuperscript{41} Likewise, the management of emotion has been argued as inherent in construction of a particular notion of emotionality.\textsuperscript{42} By analogy, the highly controversial topic of management of sex is also a construction of a particular sexuality. Therefore, like sex education, \textit{fear education} ought to receive equally important attention. This has not been the case. When have you last heard a battle going on in the public domain about sex education, or emotion education, and when have you heard such a battle about fear education?

Arguably, implicitly or explicitly, some kind of fear education (i.e., managing or conditioning) is going on all the time. The question is: \textit{how conscious do we want to be aware of this and co-participate in this as learners? How might we then assess its quality? Teachers in all kinds


\textsuperscript{40} There are literally hundreds of references to the “Integral Age” found in any literature search on the Internet these days. I am particularly referring to a time, a mood and temperament, a worldview, and a way of thinking and consciousness (according to Ken Wilber and others) comprising the next (revolutionary) developmental and evolutionary major stage beyond the Information Age. Note, that a cybernetic systems perspective \textit{via} Batesonian holism, with its “necessary epistemological incompleteness” (Berman) avoids an integral approach from overly becoming a vehicle for a Parsonian functionalism ideology. The critical theory aspect of integral theory remains with a functionalist theory aspect but neither dominates. See M. Berman, \textit{The Reenchantment of the World} (New York: Bantam, 1984), 196.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Fearuality} (coined by the author in 2000)- the domain of animal and human experience related to fear and how it is managed (analogous to sexuality, morality, or spirituality); and thus, \textit{fear education} is a useful construct, like for example, sex education, moral education, or spiritual education. Individuals and collectives construct this notion of fearuality based on many interacting factors. See R. M. Fisher, “Report on the Status of Fear Education,” Technical Paper No. 15 (Vancouver, BC: In Search of Fearlessness Research Institute, 2003).

\textsuperscript{42} See “The Quest to Control Emotion(s).”
of situations are always managing learning and fear, one way or another, for better or for worse. And, likewise, so are their students. Because every kind of management agenda also has an educational component, this author refers to the phenomenon under investigation as fear management/education (FME), a conceptual ‘unifying’ meta-umbrella that may prove useful in critical future fear studies (see for e.g., World’s Fearlessness Teachings).

It is not insignificant that the term “management” is not used explicitly by E & S or that they avoided acknowledging FME as a phenomenon and tool of analysis, even though in the latter case they had read this author’s article and cited it in a footnote. They use all kinds of replacement terms for management of fear, like “response to fear,” “controlling it,” “prevent fear” and so on. Noteworthy, they cite Freire, who conceptualized fear as “that which ‘speaks’ of our humanness as we manage to limit, subject and control it.”\(^{43}\) At one point E & S note: “While Dewey’s insights push educators toward preventing fear’s formation, nonetheless the wise educator can learn from a student’s fully formed fear.”\(^{44}\) Obvious to this author, whether E & S admit it or not, they are studying FME discourses in three major progressive educational philosophers.

FME discourses are not merely psychological phenomena, nor learning phenomena, but are also sociopolitical phenomena—arguably, inseparable as one Fear Problem. However, E & S favor and use an FME discourse themselves that stays away from the affective politics of management discourses. Rather they attempt a reductionistic psychological-learning discourse on fear. The problematic with their maneuvering around management of fear is that they don’t give a rationale for why they’ve avoided it. They imply throughout the article that what really counts is learning and fear, with fear as an emotion or feeling experience. Common as this move may be in educational circles, it is apoliticized (reduced) to such a degree, that one has to ask if the “fear” they are examining is too abstracted from the context-reality of a postmodern “culture of fear” today? E & S have read Paul Ramsey’s work, this author’s work, and ought to read Zembylas on “global economies of fear,” and the entire American cultural disposition as a “culture of fear” in the geopolitics of emotion (see Moïsi).\(^{45}\)

\(^{43}\) E & S, 539.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 535.

'Fear' Studies Critique

This article, and E & S's article, lies in the historical genre of fear studies. This author has gone to great lengths to update fear studies to a postmodern deconstructive modality into 'Fear' Studies, as a new transdisciplinary approach, using integral theory as a complementary addition to integrate a reconstructive modality. An overarching problematizing of the discourses of fear and on fear, from any discipline and/or in popular culture, is essential to 'Fear' Studies.

The beginning of such a problematizing, in the critical philosophy tradition, begins with context (and meta-contexts). The primary postmodern context of 'Fear' Studies emphasizes the cultural domain (contra, fear studies which emphasize the psychological domain). One way this author has phrased this is: *can fear actually be the same phenomena in a post-9/11 era?*; *can fear, in a culture of fear context, be the same fear?* The presumption of 'Fear' Studies is that it is not the same fear as the way fear is known in prior pre-postmodern contexts. Thus, the inverted commas on 'fear.' The premise is: *we ought to assume we cannot be so confident as we once were about what fear is and fear does, and concomitantly, how to best manage fear.* Invoking a notion of 'fear,' includes but transcends the limitations of fear studies; while invoking a humility and "necessary epistemological incompleteness" to knowing fear and 'fear.'

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46 See Fisher, "Invoking 'Fear' Studies."

47 Ibid., 52-52.

48 Ibid., 54-56.


This author has further complicated the knowing of fear and ‘fear’ by a notion of *fearism* (and ‘Fear’ Matrix). See “Invoking ‘Fear’ Studies,” 51-52.
A 'Fear' Studies critique, directly relevant to E & S’s study, directs one to ask epistemological questions, like: why such cultural contexts were so easily cleaned away from their inquiry? And, how has E & S’s study privileged a particular pre-fixed (e.g., fear = a feeling or emotion) location of fear? What significant influence does that preordained psychological overlay have upon their interpretive findings and, concomitant prescriptions they make as to how to best manage and educate ourselves about fear (and learning)? From what contextual framework would E & S critically evaluate their own fear study? How would they know their own fear study is not contributing more fear (‘fear’) to readers and learners (and society itself), rather than less? How do they justify a pre-fixed definition of “fear” without contextualizing it as constructed within but beyond the psychology of fear (emotions and affect)?

To what extent is their study undermining the current culture of fear or perpetuating it?

E & S do not invite such a dialogue or co-inquiry with their readers and colleagues about the questions above. Worse, their discourse here virtually neglects power-knowledge-based contextual, epistemic, and cultural-political questions.

Can E & S, justifiably today in a post-9/11 world, merely shaping an inquiry on fear based on “a learning-theoretical standpoint,” without a postmodern referencing? Are they not interested in a holistic (if not integral) perspective of the phenomena in question? Their results have to be dubiously reductionistic, and too abstract to some degree, because of this neglect. Again, one problem is that they assert at the beginning of their article that they “join” scholars who have tak-

50 As mentioned before in the article, the defining and meaning of fear (‘fear’) is extremely problematic, especially in light of postmodern critical pedagogue McLaren, who proclaims we are dealing with a “hypereal formation of an entirely new species of fear.” As well, even the eminent psychologist-researcher and theorists Jerome Kagan, has written a critique of the great deal of unclarity, confusion, and contradictions in the field of psychology in how fear is ascribed. See J. Kagan, Three Seductive Ideas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 15-32.

51 Postmodern and postcolonial theorists (e.g., Sara Ahmed) would surely charge E & S as having further neglected race, ethnicity, class, gender, and historical contextualizing of oppression as well in their inquiry into fear and learning. ‘Fear’ Studies engages such critiques, but would focus on “deeper structures” (e.g., discourses) of fearism within and beneath all oppressions (isms). ‘Fear’ Studies thus, is a holistic, integral and liberation initiative to an extent that E & S and most all fear studies fall well short.

52 E & S, 523.
en a “sociopolitical standpoint” on fear, safety, and educational contexts. As a ‘fear’ researcher-educator largely working within the said sociopolitical standpoint, their claim is overly contradictory to their study’s actual approach and outcomes.

Elsewhere, the justification of ‘Fear’ Studies is documented as part of a new scholarship on postmodern fear (and ‘fear’).53 The scholarly origins of ‘Fear’ Studies, before this term was coined in 2000 (by this author), can be traced historically to the mid-1980s in North America and South America.54 For example, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and others, joined (in Canada) to study fear in society and coined the new interdisciplinary approach sociophobics—largely spurred on by the awareness that psychology alone had dominated the discourse on the subject of fear for a very long time, with the social sciences lagging far behind and on catch-up.55 Arguably, a similar psychological (and clinical-medical) discourse hegemony exists in the field of Education.56

53 “Invoking ‘Fear’ Studies, 44-47.
56 Ibid., Toward a ‘Conflict’ Pedagogy, 158. Critical theorist have long critiqued the mainstream identity theories and “revisionist psychology ... [both which are] political and ideological in nature,” according to Giroux. H. A. Giroux, Pedagogy and the Politics of Hope: Theory, Culture, and Schooling (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 56. Liberal education reforms and their individualism with psychology have dominated the field of American adult education since the mid-1950s, virtually gutting the concept of “liberation,” according to Collard and Law. S. Collard and M. Law, “The Limits of Perspective Transformation: A Critique of Mezirow’s Theory,” Adult Education Quarterly, 39 (1989), 102. In terms of the role of “psychological hegemony” (and its roots in the medical-clinical model) and control of behavior by distracting anger of the oppressed into sublimated nonpolitical action, see Fraser, G. J., African American Midwifery in the South: Dialogues of Birth, Race, and Memory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 20.
The problem is psychologism, where virtually no other base definition or meaning of fear has been allowed legitimacy. Fear tends to be essentialized in biopsychological and medical discourses. This leads to people (e.g., teachers and learners) being discouraged from even imagining a more complex contemporary notion of ‘fear’ as an alternative. The hegemony of psychologism has and continues to greatly restrict discourses on fear and theories, curricula, and pedagogies of FME. That imbalance, if not oppressive pathology, needs to be countered by ‘Fear’ Studies. Any fear studies today that ignores this critical context, as E & S’s study does, is bound to lead to less than an emancipatory FME.

Summary Reflection

The 17th century was the century of mathematics, the 18th century was of physical sciences, and the 19th century biology. Our 20th century is the century of fear [and the 21st is the century of terror].

Despite the myriad of topics scrutinized under the academic study of fear, scholars are unified in their assessment that fear is deeply engrained in contemporary culture. If we ever thought that a total eclipse of fear was part of the natural maturation process of an enlightened society, it seems impossible to take that [modernist] position today.

Why all this attention to the topic of fear? Why the necessity of taking a postmodern position on understanding the phenomena? Such good questions deserve a good deal of critical dialogue in educational circles.

The evidence is overwhelming that fear, in its many forms and its process of commodification, is taking a significant toll on humans

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57 Defined in World’s Fearlessness Teachings, xl.
and public spaces. It is arguably the most important of the affects and emotions as a powerful motivating force (and lens) of human activity. However, that claim is left open here for debate. Educating ourselves on the topic is a choice and this article, like E & S’s study, has perhaps indicated there is good reason for making that choice.

For this author, the attention equally needs to be on fearlessness (e.g., bravery, bravado, courage, and even being fearless). Fear and fearlessness are dialectical phenomena, from an integral perspective. Unfortunately, E & S explicitly ignore this dynamic in their article. Any form of fearlessness (e.g., courage) is, in part, a type of fear management. Any fear management strategy is both instinctual and learned (and conditioned). Societies of all kinds systematically teach about fear management. They do that more or less well. They have at their convenience, more or less, a complicated set of resources for FME. In a postmodern world we have a complex array of information and experience, across time and cultures, available to help us.

The more research into these topics, theoretically, the better off the societies will manage and educate their citizens about fear—and arguably, the less severe conflict and violence will result. But these are remarks that many others have written about and are not the focus of this critique. Rather, the focus is placed on educators who, whether they like it or not, have an enormous critical role to play in the quality of FME. This role will become more important in the future as the world becomes increasingly dangerous and frightful with personal and global crises likely to increase before they decrease. Most anyone living in a post-9/11 era, not totally psychically-numbed, senses this impending fate as very real.

The underlying problem, according to this author, is that no one educational researcher of status and power in the professional field of Education, has taken up the study of fear or fearlessness on a consistent basis—E & S included. The topic of fear, for the most part, is anathema to educators and/or simply scares them away from it. Critical pedagogue, bell hooks, once remarked: “In our society we make much of love and say little about fear.” This creates an ethical dilemma as well, as some educators have mindfully addressed the problem.

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61 See World’s Fearlessness Teachings, for the first evolutionary theory of fearlessness and its seven forms, which are accessible as a dozen or so fear management systems.

of teaching about fear and not wanting to cause more fear.\textsuperscript{63} For this reason and others, any serious discussion and research on the topic is admirable. Whether it is E & S educating on fear, or anyone else, the primary problem is to provide sufficient self-critical reflection on the theory and practice of FME.

Typical fear studies steeped in psychology as their primary discourse, typically do not provide adequate contextualized critique of the nature and role of fear (and ‘fear’) in society. Neither Rousseau, Dewey, nor Freire, despite their invaluable contributions to understanding fear and education, are postmodern\textsuperscript{64} or integral. Without, at least, a postmodern contextualizing, FME is inevitably reduced to modernist, liberalism, reductionism and ahistorical and apolitical curricula, with a hidden ideological curriculum—less than emancipatory. Fear educators and researchers are called upon to declare this ideology fully, and give a sufficient and ethical rationale for their biased directions and ignoring the challenges of FME and ‘Fear’ Studies.\textsuperscript{65}

E & S have, more or less, subscribed and promoted a reductionistic, psychological and individualist approach to fear studies. Their focus on “fear” as the pre-given unit of study, and not on the “discourse of fear,”\textsuperscript{66} as several postmodern researchers have suggested, is problematic. Arguably, in a post-9/11 world and its growing problem of the

\textsuperscript{63} See Sardello, \textit{Freeing the Soul From Fear}, xvi.

\textsuperscript{64} Likely most Deweyians wouldn’t care to try to compare or rate Dewey in regard to a postmodern referent. This is a complex debate, and the author acknowledges some advocates of Dewey’s work have claimed his philosophy to be post-postmodern, as an advance from the Continental postmodern philosophers. See, for example, L. A. Hickman, \textit{Pragmatism as Post-Postmodern: Lessons from John Dewey} (Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2007). This debate is relevant to this article because Wilber’s integral philosophy and theory (for example), is also claimed to be post-postmodern. See Reynolds, B., \textit{Where’s Wilber At?: Ken Wilber’s Integral Vision in the New Millenium} (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2006), 73-74.

\textsuperscript{65} One can forgive scholars who have not yet encountered FME and ‘Fear’ Studies in the literature of fear studies prior to their studies and teachings; the latter is clearly not the case with E & S.

\textsuperscript{66} See for example, D. Altheide, \textit{Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis} (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2002); for Furedi, “fear is fast becoming a caricature of itself. I it is no longer simply an emotion, or a response to the perception of threat. It has become a cultural idiom [i.e., discourse] through which we signal a sense of growing unease about our place in the world.” See F. Furedi, \textit{Culture of Fear Revisited: Risk-taking and the Morality of Low Expectation} (London, UK: Continuum, 2006), vii.
culture of fear, this is incomplete knowledge, if not distortive, and thus unacceptable, if not unethical.

A truly emancipatory FME is required, as a “counter-education of fear” instead of a psychology of fear alone. A critical 'Fear' Studies can provide the foundational research and perspective for reconceptualizing fear studies in the 21st century. The lack of progress and research in 'Fear' Studies, as conceptualized by this author, is a real limitation. We are, so to speak, behind the eight ball, on catch-up, to improve FME fast enough for the demands that fear and 'fear' are placing on our postmodern society and global societies in general.

'Fear' Studies offers as an alternative to the E & S progressive approach. It is based on an integral approach, which serves as a meta-theoretical framework. The integral perspective challenges just how progressive E & S’s study is, and likewise the educational philosophers they studied.

The problem with such integral approaches is that they are new and typically unfamiliar to most others and thus are easily marginalized. They also tend to be somewhat abstract, with little empirical foundations at their forefront—and are seen as less pragmatic, at first sight. Thus, they are typically rejected when people are searching or quick solutions. Lastly, the integral approach is extremely demanding, in terms of fear researchers needing to look at the full diversity of knowledge assumptions, perspectives, and power-knowledge privileging that goes on prior to their taking up the study of fear. This requires a critical discourse sensibility and thus explicit rationales of why particular reductionistic approaches are often taken by non-integral researchers and educators. Ultimately, this integral approach, an advanced critical theory, demands a critical praxis when it comes to fear and fearlessness.

Will we use our knowledge about fear and 'fear' wisely? Will we use it fearlessly, rather than with fear-based motivations? It may be critical that we do, especially in regard to our ability to create and disseminate the best FME possible. We’ll need all the intelligence we can get to solve our global problems. The less paralyzed we can be by ex-

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cessive productions of fear and 'fear,' the better. Initiating a new 'Fear' Studies will greatly assist this cause.

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